If All Goes as Expected, Americans Might Conclude That We Like It This Way

Assuming the election and reelection of George Bush, by 1996 the Republicans will have held the presidency almost continually for 28 years. It will not be easy even to imagine a Democratic presidency, something that only those well past midlife will remember clearly--and that being only the uninspiring Carter interlude. No Democrats will be able to speak authoritatively as holders or former holders of high administrative position or offer themselves credibly as the staff of a possible Democratic Administration.

The election of Bush by a large majority would be a long step toward more or less permanent one-party dominance in the United States. This is not remarkable; it is in line with the experience of other Western democracies. In Japan the same party has been at the helm, with a single brief interruption, continuously since soon after World War II. In Italy the Christian Democrats have been the strongest force in all governments since 1945. In West Germany the Christian Democrats have led in every election except one since the republic was founded in 1949. Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives have been in power in Britain since 1979, and are strongly favored to win the next election. Except for 1976-78, the Christian Democrats have governed Sweden since 1932. Among the major European powers, only France has an approximate balance between two parties, probably because of the inability of the moderate-conservatives to form a single organization.

The party holding power regularly has an advantage, and this advantage tends to grow over the years. Most people are rather conservative at heart and prefer to keep things more or less as they are as long as times are reasonably good. To bring outsiders to the top is risky; one never knows what they might do. The insiders are familiar, hence more easily trusted. To make a case for replacing the known with the unknown, outsiders have to criticize and complain. And that seems like negativism and carping, unless the country is decidedly unhappy. The Depression in 1932 gave power to the Democrats, and the Vietnam War brought in the Republicans in 1968.

Those who run for office from the seats of power also have the advantage of being, almost by definition, mainstream. The opposition is dominated by the discontented, those who dissent from the way things are being done. They can be influential, though not necessarily in a positive sense. Michael Dukakis had to lean in the direction of Jesse Jackson to win the nomination; fighting for the presidency, he tried in vain to portray himself as more moderate. The candidate coming out of an incumbent Administration has no such problem; he speaks for those with a vested interest in status quo.

The opposition is made up of many different tendencies that have countless, often contradictory, reasons to be against the governing power. Consequently, the “outs” cannot maintain much of an organization. The party in office not only has greater resources but also has a single unifying drive: to stay in power. There are differences among Republicans, but they are slight compared to differences among Democrats.

Furthermore, there are big advantages of experience. Among the Democrats, only a few survivors of the Carter Administration can claim practice in foreign affairs. A few in Congress have had some close acquaintance with foreign policy, but they have had nothing to do with its application. Hardly any Democrats have any record in national administration. Thanks to the federal system, a number of Democratic governors have had administrative experience in their states, but this is less impressive than a record at the national level.

The candidate of the party in power is also strengthened by having aides and advisers with experience at the top of government in all fields, from finance to welfare to defense. They can give a solidity to his campaign that the opposition lacks. Moreover, the candidate of the “in” party finds it easy to assemble a corps of highly qualified political organizers; the oppositionist has difficulty putting together an organization. This was especially evidentin the way the smooth Bush organization contrasted with the amateurish Dukakis effort.

The insiders have always had an advantage, and it has often taken a special circumstance to dislodge them, as in 1932 and 1968. But their advantage seems to be growing with modernization and the prevalence of television. There is less spontaneity and more packaging; smooth professional work can sell a reasonably qualified candidate. Government becomes ever more complicated, so experience counts for more. For such reasons, Bush was able to chalk up a strong victory despite the fact that he had no considerable achievements to his credit, his running-mate was a drag, and his opponent made no major blunders.

In this situation the opposition may recognize that it is unlikely to win control of the government and may become discouraged. A 1 1/2-party system may lie ahead.

There is something to be said for a change of parties at the helm of government; it clears the air and permits new beginnings. It is hardly democratic for any group to see itself as the natural holder of power, and it is inspiring that the person-in-the-street can turn the moguls out on occasion. But for stability and continuity it is well for one party to continue (with the qualification that no individual stays on for an excessive period). High officials can accumulate expertise in both domestic and foreign policy; there is no trauma of replacing a thousand or so leaders at the top for largely partisan reasons.

The opposition is left with the useful function of criticizing and checking the Administration. Americans seem to like it this way as they elect Republicans to the presidency and a majority of Democrats to Congress, giving solidity to administrative policy without permitting anything rash. Barring calamitous events, that seems to be the way things will go for a long time.