CALIFORNIA: GROWING UP AND DOWN : The Trouble With Budgets and a Governor’s Veto Power

SACRAMENTO —  Gov. George Deukmejian’s recent use of the line-item veto to cancel, almost without exception, all the changes made by the Legislature in his proposed budget--and President Reagan’s plea that he be given the same opportunity to control federal expenditures--calls for a careful examination of that powerful authority.

In California the veto has been one of the principal ways for shared control of the purse strings between the executive and legislative branches of the government. That sharing heavily favors the governor. During his five years in office, Deukmejian has used his line-item veto authority to cut out $3.74 billion from legislative budget augmentations, and has made such vetoes a major feature of his political campaigning.

Ronald Reagan, when he was governor of California, similarly used the veto effectively to pursue his conservative fiscal agenda, as have other California governors in varying degrees. Unquestionably, it is a powerful tool for controlling the level of spending.

But the effect goes far beyond that objective. It also shapes the policies that apply to myriad other issues, some of which are of major significance. It effectively places policy control over almost all activities of the government in the hands of one person, the governor, because the budget bill is the money vehicle for implementing such activities.

I believe the law should be changed to share that power in a manner that reinforces the governor’s role in controlling the level of budgeted expenditures, while at the same time strengthening the Legislature’s legitimate role in setting policy.

Deukmejian’s vetoes last month in essence restored the budget to the exact form in which he presented it six months ago to the Legislature. This meant deleting numerous items added or increased by the Legislature as a result of its extensive review of the document. Included were modest amounts for programs felt significant by the Legislature, such as the state worker-safety program and programs dealing with acquired immune deficiency syndrome, or AIDS.

All of these increases were made by a two-thirds vote of both houses, and although the Legislature can override the vetoes by a similar two-thirds majority vote, this has rarely been successful. While conceptually the Legislature is empowered to have the last word on money matters, as a practical matter it does not. The budget result, rightly or wrongly, is a governor’s authoritarian decision, not a representative, legislative one.

President Reagan frequently protests that as President he does not have the line-item veto power he possessed as governor. But as governor he was also required to present a balanced budget to the Legislature--an obligation he does not have as President. Thus he is also sponsoring a proposal to require that by law the President must do so. A federal balanced-budget requirement would paradoxically mandate, as a practical matter, that Reagan recommend raising federal taxes, an action he vociferously opposes.

The state Constitution giving the governor the duty of developing a balanced budget requires that if the proposed expenditures do not provide sufficient revenue to fund them, the governor must propose the method for increasing revenues to meet that need. This is what happened when Reagan was governor--he asked for revenue increases on more than one occasion when his budget balancing required it.

There are good reasons why the capacity for using the line-item budget veto to balance the budget should remain in the hands of a governor. However, the existing law should be modified to limit the governor’s unnecessary and undesirable control over other policy decisions that more properly belong to the Legislature.

The governor under existing law is obligated to present the Legislature with a balanced budget plan. All agencies must respond to his requests for information. That budget, converted into a bill, must be introduced for consideration by the Legislature exactly as proposed by the governor. The governor thereafter may amend his proposal at any time until it is passed by the Legislature, which generally takes about six months. After review, assisted by a substantial report prepared by the Legislature’s own analyst, both houses consider amendments and finally act on the measure. It is then sent to the governor for signature. He may sign it with or without vetoing individual items. He may not add to the bill.

My change would still forbid the Legislature, after the governor signs the budget bill in whatever form and amount he determines, to increase that total amount except, as is the case now, with a two-thirds vote of both houses. But the Legislature, by simple majority , could vote to change, within a specified number of days, the items within that total. This would apply only to matters included in the budget bill previously passed by the Legislature and sent to the governor. Such a change would offer legislators an opportunity to rearrange priorities without increasing the size of the budget.

Why should the governor continue to control the budget total? The legislative body is a multiplicity of voices and interests, the most representative instrument in the government, structured to respond to citizens and organized interests on all sides of issues, to compromise and correspondingly be required to make all decisions by consensus. While that does reflect the democratic interests of the people, it also makes the result of its budget-review labors almost invariably a larger sum than that constructed with autocratic authority by the governor.

What is clearly needed is a revised veto instrument--one recognizing the policy desires of the public as reflected in the collective judgments of its representatives, while holding in check their collective propensity to overspend. It deserves serious consideration.