The Widening War

The 19 foreign ministers of NATO have resolved to continue pressing the air campaign against Yugoslavia, a welcome sign of cohesion in a coalition whose members have sometimes had a hard time agreeing on what aims and means to pursue in the Balkan conflict. Simultaneously, U.S. Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO’s commander, has asked the Pentagon to commit hundreds of additional planes to the battle, an effort likely to require calling up National Guard and Reserve units while further depleting air strength in other critical areas.

The escalation in air power is aimed in part at impressing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic with NATO’s determination to stay the course as it labors to quash his repression in Kosovo. That escalation is also further evidence that NATO and the Clinton administration seriously and--in the case of the Kosovo Albanian victims of Milosevic’s brutal “ethnic cleansing” policy--fatally underestimated the level of force that would be needed to protect the Kosovo Albanians from Serbian forces.

An expanded air war promises to broaden the boundaries of the war zone.

Albania, which has become the major haven for Kosovo Albanians driven from their homes, will become the base for the 24 U.S. Apache helicopters that, once they are finally sent into action after an inexplicably long delay, could contribute significantly to blunting the effectiveness of Serb forces in Kosovo.As the skies over the Balkans become more crowded with U.S. and other NATO warplanes, basing and logistical problems will increase.

There’s a good chance that one of NATO’s newest members, Hungary, could become a launching point for planes attacking neighboring Yugoslavia.

Clark and the Clinton administration’s highest officials continue to express confidence that air power alone will succeed in achieving NATO’s objectives. Others, among them Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, two of Congress’ best-informed members on military matters, argue that an unambiguous readiness to put American and other NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo is essential if Milosevic is to be forced to agree to a settlement on NATO’s terms. But McCain and Lugar are among the few in Congress so far willing to support such a controversial and potentially risky step.

The politics of committing troops to Kosovo continues to dominate debate and decision-making in Washington.

When Clinton early on ruled out sending ground forces to Kosovo in any role other than peacekeepers, he put aside a useful threat that should have been kept in reserve. Republicans, with a few noted exceptions, seem content for now to leave the burden of choice wholly with the administration. It may yet be that those who believe air power can win NATO’s objectives will be vindicated. But at a minimum the alternative--sending in infantry and tanks prepared to do battle--deserves to be thoughtfully debated. Kosovo remains a contest that NATO cannot afford to lose, if there is still to be a NATO the next time European security is threatened.