Intelligence Agencies

Jonathan Clarke (Opinion, Sept. 3) aptly describes the unpleasant realities of intelligence collection but does not address the main fault of the system: No single agency should ever be given the joint responsibilities of intelligence and operations, especially a clandestine entity enjoying generous funding and lax oversight. This fosters the “old boy� mind-set that gave rise to the CIA’s incredible involvement in a huge illegal importation of cocaine, as well as the Aldrich Ames scandal.

The perils of unchecked in-house scheming are well illustrated by two apparent triumphs of the CIA, both of them indiscreetly and permanently celebrated: the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s nationalist government, creating great resentment of the U.S. and contributing finally to the ouster of the shah by the hostile mullahs still in power, and the 1954 coup against Guatemala’s last freely elected government, leaving it saddled to this day with the bloodiest, most corrupt regime of the Americas.

Presumably these “successes� encouraged the CIA to launch the 1961 invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, an outright disaster that may never be fully understood because so many reputations are at stake. President Kennedy’s indecisive handling of this fiasco may well have emboldened the Soviets to take risks which culminated in the potentially catastrophic Cuban missile crisis of 1962, diverted attention and resources from his imaginative development program for Latin America and impelled him to a deeper involvement in Vietnam in order to restore U.S. prestige.

MARSHALL PHILLIPS

Foreign Service Officer (Ret.)

Long Beach