Arias Plan Is the Best Hope for Peace : But Central American Pact Needs to Avoid a New Bay of Pigs

In Central America both the extreme right and the extreme left are incapable of solving social and economic ills that affect the countries, and are equally unwilling to accept democratic pluralism.

This alienation from reality has been accentuated by the geopolitical and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. And so it falls to the democratic center to try to cure the ills, to establish or support pluralism and to keep foreign entanglements at bay.

Oscar Arias Sanchez belongs to that democratic center and is the author of the peace plan fittingly titled “Procedure for the establishment of firm and permanent peace in Central America,” recently signed by five presidents in the region.

He is also the president of Costa Rica, a country with no organized army that nonetheless has achieved political democracy, an impressive literacy rate, Central America’s highest standard of living and its most advanced social-welfare network.

Arias’ pursuit of peace is motivated as much by considerations of sheer national self-preservation as by a spirit of solidarity with his country’s neighbors. The Costa Rican system, which is embedded in an interlocking pattern of Central American relations, is threatened by the Nicaraguan regime, its polar opposite.

Costa Rica inevitably will either moderate the Sandinistas or confront them. Arias seeks peace by means of the democratization of Nicaragua.

Thus Arias would have the Central Americans trade bullets for ballots, and his plan for the establishment of “firm and permanent peace” emphasizes self-evident truths. Peace is firm if, as in Costa Rica, its preservation is entrusted to a government that neither yields to foreign pressure nor resorts to domestic repression. Peace is permanent if, as in Costa Rica, it is based on institutions that are obedient to the popular will.

His plan recognizes the parallel between the Nicaraguan rebels and their Salvadoran counterparts. Accordingly, foreign aid to both groups would be banned, but the governments that they fight would be entitled to continue receiving support from their respective allies. These governments in turn would implement cease-fires and amnesties to the rebels before Nov. 7.

In addition, the plan calls for negotiations between domestic political parties and the governments in place. The Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church, under the leadership of Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, would play a crucial role in the National Commission of Reconciliation. A specific goal already stated by the plan is free elections, observed by foreign teams and to be held when the current presidents complete their terms.

Obviously the immediate achievement of the plan would be to put an end to the killing and maiming of the young conscripts and volunteers, as well as innocent civilians, on all sides.

But there would be additional positive consequences:

--This initiative, forged by Central Americans and for Central Americans, would leave the defense of the Western Hemisphere primarily to the United States. When Daniel Ortega has refused to negotiate with the rebels, demanding instead a dialogue with the United States, he has said that he wanted to “talk not to the dog, but to its owner.” It is high time that the U.S. government apply the same logic: If it decides to talk, it should do it not with the Sandinistas but with the Soviet Union.

--”American aggression,” the all-encompassing excuse for the managerial ineptitude and ideological rigidity of the Sandinistas, would be removed. To take one example, the recent price increases in basic foods (corn tortillas, 100%; beans and milk, 300% each) in an agricultural economy that was, before the Sandinistas, among the most successful producers in the region must either disappear or be seen as the result of internal political and economic decisions.

--Pragmatic Sandinista comandantes , if they exist, now have a rallying point. They must exert pressure on their less flexible comrades to modify their political project, or forever put to rest the perception among some foreign observers that they are in fact pragmatic.

--As the waters become less muddied, the Latin Americans and Western Europeans will be called on to prove their sincerity in supporting peace and democracy in Nicaragua. Heretofore, many of them have focused on the need for Nicaraguan self-determination while ignoring the abuses that the Sandinistas have perpetrated against their own people. This time around, democratic countries should distinguish between justice for the Nicaraguan people and Sandinista sophistry. One could also hope that internationalists and solidarity groups stop meddling in Nicaragua. If the Sandinistas do not honor the agreement signed in Guatemala, it is only fair to hope that the democratic world will not look the other way as it did when the Sandinistas broke the promises that they made in 1979 to the Organization of American States. The resistance will also have its own credibility in the balance. It cannot make unreasonable demands.

The Arias plan may be our best and perhaps our last chance for peace. As a Nicaraguan, I support it. But, in my judgment, two amendments and one recommendation are necessary.

The first has to do with fairness and responsibility. I have had bitterly disappointing experiences with the Sandinistas and the leadership of the contras. Yet we must all recognize that under both commands thousands of good men and women have sacrificed life and limb. Meaningful negotiations cannot exclude either camp. If the Nicaraguan rebels are ignored, the Arias peace plan may well degenerate into appeasement. At a minimum, the rebels must participate by delegating to a representative of the internal opposition. Furthermore, President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and the Salvadoran rebels have agreed to hold talks. If this occurs as planned, the internal symmetry that Arias seeks for the region would dictate that the Sandinistas follow suit.

The second amendment has to do with the calendar for the execution of the plan. The five presidents should take steps to ensure the immediate suspension of hostilities in Nicaragua and the establishment of an ad hoc commission to supervise adequate security and logistical support to the rebels. Otherwise there is the danger of a Bay of Pigs situation, where by November the rebels may be cut off from American aid while the Sandinistas in the interim may have further consolidated their military position.

Finally, the Central American governments, as members of the international commission that was designed to follow up and verify the peace process, must be prepared to execute this task diligently and over a substantial period.

In summary, the Arias plan has a greater chance of success than previous proposals have had, because some stumbling blocks have been eliminated. The timing is right. The Sandinistas are beset by insurmountable economic problems, and the country’s rebels are hitting them hard. U.S. policy, which had been floundering, has taken a significant bipartisan turn with the peace proposal that has been put forward by President Reagan and House Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.).

And for the Nicaraguan people the Arias plan represents a visible, and the only available, vehicle in which to escape from our present tragedy.