Colombia Is More Than a War on Drugs

The House on Thursday passed a $1.7-billion military and economic aid package for Colombia to help that country fight its wars against the drug trade and against longtime insurgencies that now obtain substantial financial support from narcotics traffickers. The bill now moves to the Senate.

Although the American public is mostly unaware of this proposal for a sharp escalation of U.S. involvement in Colombia, an intense debate is occurring among the most interested parties: those who want to pursue a tougher international crusade against narcotics; those who are primarily concerned about the extremely poor human rights record of the Colombian armed forces, who would receive the massive U.S. aid; those who argue from past cases--El Salvador in particular--that U.S. counter-insurgency support can bring peace or that it is a recipe for prolonged war; and those whose appraisal is shaped mainly by budget politics.

Each party argues that only the course it recommends will avert catastrophe. Those who push for a strong U.S. program assert that failing to counter the insurgencies and curb the drug trade now will lead to Colombia’s collapse, with disastrous consequences for the stability of its neighbors, the cause of Latin American democracy and the control of drugs. Critics of the requested aid warn that it would strengthen the most repressive elements of Colombian society, undermine civilian control of the armed forces, result in increased human rights violations and eventually put at risk the lives of American advisors and trainees. Some even predict that enhanced involvement may move the U.S. closer to massive and direct military intervention.

It would be much better for Congress to make this decision, and for public opinion to comprehend it, with a better-informed assessment of Colombia’s problems and of the limits on America’s power to reshape Colombia’s complex internal dynamics.

Colombia suffers from a profound crisis of governance, a huge failure of institutions that arises from decades of exclusionary politics; years of denial about the inroads drug lords were making in the economy, society and politics; and widespread loss of confidence in those who have long held power. That both a Marxist insurgency and criminal syndicates are so powerful is more an effect than a cause of the abject failure of its state and other institutions.

It is unlikely that any external involvement will have much effect on Colombia’s deep underlying crisis unless Colombians themselves mobilize the will, sacrifice and commitment to fight injustice, impunity and corruption.

If they fail to reverse the country’s deterioration, Colombians surely will suffer, and neighboring countries may be affected, but the consequences of Colombia’s tragedy for the U.S. probably will not be dramatically different from what they are now.

The current administration of President Andres Pastrana has done more than its predecessors to seek a peaceful settlement with insurgent groups, to clean up the armed forces and police and to strengthen civilian authority. The Colombian strategy of focusing first on ending the insurgency through negotiation, not primarily on the narcotics issue, should structure U.S. thinking about whether and how to be involved.

The strongest case for approving the requested Colombian appropriation rests on the argument that there are some real, if limited, prospects that the Pastrana government could modestly advance its approach if it had U.S. assistance. As the strongest and most prosperous country in the world, the United States can afford to take concrete steps that might help friendly neighbors avert disaster.

The fact that the U.S. has the resources does not mean it has the right answers. Washington should make security and economic assistance available while focusing on how to minimize the risks of more direct U.S. military involvement. In deciding whether and how long to sustain such assistance, Washington should evaluate Colombia’s progress toward ending the insurgency and strengthening national institutions, not on how much is spent to interfere with narcotics traffic.

The congressional debate on the Colombian aid package distorts our understanding of Colombia’s problems and our prospects for being helpful in responding to them by viewing Colombia almost entirely through the prism of drug policy. Washington finds it easier, understandably, to pretend it is facing up to our drug problem by addressing it abroad rather than confronting it adequately at home. That may make good domestic politics but it adds up to unwise policy, at home and abroad.