Europe Must Anchor the Balkans

WASHINGTON â€”  The Balkans have arrived at a historic watershed. The current round of conflict will either give way to the redrawing of boundaries along cultural and religious lines, trampling the principle of multiethnicity and leaving homogenous states uncomfortably alongside one another; or the region will escape its past and its nationalist hatreds, moving to enter Europe’s political and economic mainstream. Which outcome prevails will determine not just the future of the Balkans, but also the future of Europe. The European Union will score a major victory in its quest to build a peaceful continent if it succeeds in integrating the Balkan peninsula into its ranks. If, however, the Balkans stumble, so will the broader European enterprise.

The United States and its European partners have spent much of the past decade fighting to preserve multiethnicity in the Balkans. On the surface, they have succeeded. Intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in both Bosnia and Kosovo stopped ethnic cleansing and preserved intact borders. But beneath the surface, multiethnicity is in precarious shape. Bosnia may be a unitary state, but its Muslims, Croats and Serbs live separately. Kosovo may still nominally be part of Serbia, but few, if any, Serbs are likely to remain as returning Albanians stake their claims.

If the international community is to defeat virulent nationalism in the Balkans, it must capitalize on the momentum provided by NATO’s success in Kosovo to implement a long-term strategy for the region. This strategy should be guided by three overarching principles: First, the international community should be far more muscular than it has been in governing the region. Bosnia and Kosovo are effectively NATO protectorates and should be run as such. Second, instead of putting primary focus on economic and political integration among the Balkan states, the region as a whole should be integrated into Europe. Integration into the European Union has built a lasting peace in Western Europe; it promises to do the same for the continent’s southeast. Third, NATO should focus on building a new relationship with Russia. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic backed down only when he realized Moscow was no longer on his side, making clear that cooperation with Russia is key to building a wider and more stable Europe.

Irresponsible and opportunistic leaders have been the immediate cause of the deadly nationalism ravaging the Balkans throughout the decade. Milosevic has been leading the pack. But these leaders have been successful in stirring up ethnic hatreds because of the historical and cultural tools at their disposal. The tragedy of the Balkans is, in part, a function of the legacy of the past.

When the Ottomans ruled the Balkans, they governed through the millet system, organizing politics along ethnic and religious lines. Political cleavages are still falling along cultural fault lines. The timing of the birth of the nation-state also plagued the Balkans. In Western Europe, the rise of the national idea coincided with the decline of religion. So the nation-state crystallized with the church outside it. But national states took shape in the Balkans while religion was alive and well. The nation-state crystallized with the church inside it, leading to a volatile mix of nationhood and religion.

These historical legacies mean that removing Milosevic and arresting the region’s many other war criminals will not solve the problem; whole political systems, not just those at the helm, have gone badly awry. Accordingly, it is not enough for NATO just to stop the fighting and arrest the worst offenders of ethnic cleansing. The international community needs to follow through and do what is necessary to ensure lasting political and economic reform throughout the region.

This task will require far more robust governance than has been exercised in Bosnia. The Office of the High Representative moved into Sarajevo with thousands of the international community’s best and brightest. But this apparatus sits atop preexisting political parties and patronage systems, effectively blocking its attempts to govern and bring reform. Efforts to restore multiethnicity to Bosnia are essentially dead in the water.

The international community needs to be far more intrusive. In Bosnia, a change of the voting system must be pushed through to break the stranglehold of ethnic parties on the electorate. Indicted war criminals should be arrested and taken to trial. Intrusive measures are also needed to break down the cronyism that is suffocating the economy.

Kosovo will be no different. It will take years for the Kosovar Albanians to develop a functioning civil administration, effective judiciary and thriving economy. If any Serbs remain, NATO will have to protect them and ensure their rights.

The U.N. special representative soon to be selected to oversee the reconstruction of Kosovo must therefore govern with a heavy hand. Especially because of cumbersome U.N. decision-making, the special representative must have the autonomy and authority to run Kosovo. Establishment of a virtual protectorate may smack of colonialism, but it is the only way to help the Balkans climb out of their rut and buy time so political and economic reforms can take root.

The second key element of a long-term strategy is drawing the region into the European Union. As Yugoslavia has unraveled, the international community has sought to stimulate intraregional economic integration to offset the forces of fragmentation. Building economic links across communal boundaries, the theory goes, should help repair ethnic ties. But in Bosnia, little commerce is taking place across ethnic boundaries. The wounds are too fresh, the memories too vivid.

Instead, the states of the region need to work toward a goal that transcends residual ethnic animosities. That goal is entering Europe’s markets and institutions. Rather than remaining a backward periphery, the Balkans must join the European core. The Balkan states and their electorates are far more interested in attaching themselves to Europe than to each other, meaning the prospect of entry into the EU will help provide the social momentum and discipline required to carry out political and economic reforms.

In addition, attaching the Balkan states to Europe would have positive spillover effects on intercommunal ties. Integration into European markets should help build a middle class in the region. Prosperity should, in turn, foster political moderation, allowing inter-communal economic ties to emerge of their own accord.

The final element of a comprehensive plan for building a lasting peace in the Balkans entails drawing Russia into a broader Atlantic security order. Since the Cold War’s end, the West has effectively excluded Russia from its inner sanctums. NATO added new members from Central Europe despite Russian objections. The alliance plans to continue moving eastward, further isolating Moscow. And most countries in central and southeastern Europe give Russia a cold shoulder because of the bitter memories of Soviet occupation.

The exclusion and humiliation of Russia are unnecessary and counterproductive. If any one factor convinced Milosevic to capitulate, it was Russia’s willingness to close ranks with NATO on the diplomatic front. The dash of Russian troops from Bosnia to the Pristina airport was unfortunate. But it was a childish expression of how cut out of Europe the Russians feel, not a sign of a wayward, renegade state.

NATO should capitalize on its cooperation with Russia in the Balkans to turn the corner on its relationship with Moscow. The Kremlin’s ties to Belgrade may ultimately prove instrumental in facilitating a change of regime in Yugoslavia and removing the key stumbling block to regionwide reconstruction. As other threats to stability emerge in Europe’s east, where NATO will be less likely to risk engagement, Russian cooperation will be even more important. If Russia works with, rather than against, the West, efforts to stabilize a Europe in transition will be immeasurably furthered.

The Balkans will remain a thorny problem for Europe for at least another decade. The region will require thousands of NATO troops, billions of dollars for reconstruction and continuous political support and attention. The key question is whether ethnic rivalry will outlast the international community or whether the international community has the patience and determination to anchor the Balkans in Europe. The answer is far off. But decisions in the coming months will determine which future lies ahead for the Balkans and for Europe.