A Restructuring in Search of a Strategy : Defense: Our efforts to cut back the military now must not leave us fatally weakened a decade down the road.

The unraveling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, following clear evidence that Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his colleagues are deemphasizing the military component of Soviet power in favor of an attempt to cure the disastrous state of the Soviet economy, justifies a restructuring of U.S. military forces and a lower budget level that economic policy-makers have long sought in response to deficit-reduction pressure.

But in deciding on the level and structure of defense programs, a key problem will be to ensure that a future reversal in Soviet policy (a possibility even though a complete return to pre-Gorbachev days seems wildly improbable) would not find a fatally weakened American and allied military capability in Europe or elsewhere.

In the absence of a developed and articulated security policy for the 1990s, what can be said about the future defense program?

The changed international political environment suggests a reduced active-duty force structure with more emphasis on reserves; retention of a high degree of readiness for strategic, forward-deployed and quick-reaction forces (but reduced readiness for the rest); full sustainability for ready forces, and a change in emphasis on modernization to ensure that the technology of systems will be available a decade from now.

Turning to more specific issues, strategic nuclear weapons are not about to disappear. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain nuclear superpowers. The likelihood of strategic nuclear war, already very low, is made still lower by the easing of U.S.-Soviet political conflict. But a robust strategic deterrent remains the highest priority requirement of military forces. The strategic nuclear balance is stable, the more so with the demise of the Strategic Defense Initiative except as a research program. But that stability can be retained, or even improved, at a lower level providing that the reductions are properly structured and accompanied by a modernization emphasizing survivable forces. A strategic arms reduction agreement along the lines that have emerged would serve that purpose. Retention of a triad of forces is also indicated, but a desirable movement to a force of small mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and aircraft may have to be stretched out by budget reductions and the wrong decisions (the B-1 bomber, rail-mobile MX missile) of the 1980s.

The bulk (80% to 85%) of defense expenditures, however, go to conventional forces. And a large fraction of these are oriented toward, or justified on the basis of, the force balance in Europe.

Clearly, the political situation in the coming years--in any of the more likely scenarios--will dictate a lower level of such forces. Withdrawals of U.S. ground and air forces should be done as part of arms reduction agreements on conventional forces in Europe. These should contain the necessary provisions about where American and Soviet forces go and what happens to them.

Only the disbanding of such U.S. forces, as contemplated in the present NATO proposal, would reduce the budget; merely returning those forces to the United States would not. Additional forces in the United States could be moved to reserve status.

The Asian political situation (especially in North Korea) has not yet paralleled that of Europe. Correspondingly, the issues of U.S. forward deployments and base structure do not have the immediacy of those in Europe. But Philippine base negotiations, U.S.-South Korean political-economic relations and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s age will push them forward in the next year or two. In the absence of Asian equivalents to the Atlantic Alliance or the European Community, it makes sense to move carefully.

Force projection forces will continue to be needed. Quick reaction forces (airborne and airmobile Army and Marine divisions) and the associated lift forces and air support will require a high degree of readiness--and stocks to sustain them for some months. The Navy will not and should not reach its 600-ship aspiration. Carriers are useful for force projection, though vulnerable to attack by advanced submarine or bomber weapons; 12 carrier battle groups will surely be enough for a balanced force. The Navy should concentrate more on antisubmarine and anti-cruise missile defenses.

As to modernization of conventional forces, it makes sense to retire older equipment while keeping a fraction of the present production lines going slowly. A warm production line is good insurance, but we don’t need all the models now in production and can delay the next, far-more expensive generation of weapons. When we do buy them they will need to embody advanced technology, not only use against a less likely Soviet military threat but for possible use against Soviet-provided weapons elsewhere.

The use of force, and the threat of its use for purposes of political intimidation, will not disappear from international relations. The Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central America provide examples. This does not mean that U.S. forces should be involved, but it does mean that we need military capabilities. And the stabilizing role of U.S. military capability for Europe and in East Asia, with decreased deployed forces and plans for reinforcement from the United States, is by no means exhausted. The political stability of Europe, East and West, is not automatic. A military balance, at a lower level in the context of an eased European political situation, is an important factor in making political and economic progress.

We can only hope that a new national security strategy is being formulated, that it will then be translated by the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with their staffs, into a military strategy, that defense programs and budgets will be derived from that strategy and that Congress will judge those programs and budgets on the basis of their military merit, rather than as elements in a public-works program.