Can Soviets Accept ‘Sufficient’ Forces?

When Kremlin leaders borrow words from our own political or military lexicon, it is always risky to assume that they carry the same meaning. Western analysts are, therefore, watching with great interest to see what the Soviets really mean when they talk about military “sufficiency.”

Some experts are convinced that the Soviets are redefining their security requirements in ways that require smaller and less threatening military forces. Others warn that this may be wishful thinking.

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev caught the interest of Kremlin-watchers with a speech last February in which he asserted, “We shall not make a single step in excess of the demands of sensible, sufficient defense.”

Gorbachev didn’t spell out his criteria for a “sufficient defense.” Some of his lieutenants have elaborated a bit, however.

Defense Minister Dmitri T. Yazov said in a recent Pravda article that East and West should lower their respective armaments to levels that would “safeguard their defense” but not leave “forces and means for offensive action.” The defense ministry’s No. 2 man similarly wrote that the military potential of both sides should be cut back “to limits that are necessary only for defense and not for attack.”

Given the Soviet Union’s traditional reliance on excessive military power, these are eye-opening statements indeed. Air Force Col. Serge A. Chernay, chief of Soviet policy studies at the Air War College, noted last month that the doctrinal discussions are consistent with the Soviet need to rechannel resources into modernization of the economy. If events demonstrate that the Soviets mean what they appear to be saying, he said, there could be a significant effect on American military budgets and strategic thought.

The idea of military “sufficiency” as a standard for defense requirements originated 15 years ago with the Nixon Administration, which did not want its flexibility in arms-control negotiations to be unduly restricted by verbal commitments to numerical parity. The connotation was that U.S. national security does not require nuclear superiority, or even strict parity, as long as American forces are sufficient to deter the Soviets from aggression or political bullying.

There is no conclusive evidence that Gorbachev and his lieutenants are using the term in the same spirit, but there are reasons for hope.

The Soviet leader has openly talked about the need to restrain the arms race in order to free resources for the civilian economy. He is reported to have told Soviet military leaders the same thing at a 1985 closed meeting in which he served notice of impending cuts in military spending.

In his address to the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev said that Soviet national security could not be guaranteed by military means alone, that a sound economy was also essential. He also called for recognition of the fact that security had to be mutual, that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could be secure if the other was insecure.

Not all the fine print has been worked out, but the Soviets have agreed to elimination of all medium-range and shorter-range missiles with a reach of more than 300 miles. If the treaty goes through, the Soviets will be removing more than 1,400 nuclear warheads to our 400.

The Soviets seem to be genuinely interested in an agreement banning the use or possession of chemical arms, an area in which they have a clear superiority.

In response to concern that the prospective missile agreement will leave Western Europe more vulnerable to the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority in conventional, non-nuclear forces, the Soviets have also professed an interest in conventional arms reductions.

Moscow has even suggested a willingness to make larger cuts in their own forces in order to achieve a balance at lower levels. Just last week Lev Tolkunov, president of the Supreme Soviet, said in Brussels, “Those who have supremacy in certain types of (conventional) armaments should bring them down to the level of those who have not.

Skeptics say that all this is too good to be true. They could still be proved right.

Important arms control agreements appear to be close, but so far the birds are still in the bush. Despite the encouraging mentions of “sufficiency” as a standard for military requirements, Western experts say that defense of the Soviet-led community continues to be discussed also in terms of strengthening its military power.

Despite Gorbachev’s suggestions that Moscow will take a less confrontational posture in the Third World, the State Department reports that Soviet use of forged documents to cause trouble for the United States has increased since Gorbachev took over. Also, Western diplomats say the amount of Soviet bloc military supplies to Nicaragua so far in 1987 is 30% higher than in the same period last year, which in turn was 25% higher than the pre-Gorbachev year of 1984.

Gorbachev’s arms control posture and talk about a more defensive military strategy are consistent with a genuine desire to decelerate the arms competition while he tries to reform the creaking Soviet economy. So far, unfortunately, they can also be explained as a skillful con job.

What happens to the various arms reduction negotiations in the next few months--especially those relating to reductions in conventional arms in Europe--should reveal a lot about Moscow’s actual intentions.

One idea that is gaining strength, in Congress and among outside experts, is that the United States and its European allies should press the Soviets to accept big reductions in its forward-based armored units--those that present the greatest threat of surprise attack. The Western powers, for their part, should ponder Soviet suggestions for creation of a 90-mile-wide buffer zone between their forces in Europe.

In short, skepticism is still in order. But we should encourage Gorbachev to translate smooth rhetoric into positive action--and not be too surprised if, for his own reasons, he does.